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THE POWER OF A TRIAL JUDGE
TO CALL A WITNESSA TOOL TO MEND DEFECTS
I. I-ToDucToN

The power of a trial judge to assist the fact finding process
of the adversary system, by calling his own witnesses in the
interest of justice, has been generally recognized by the American judiciary.' Normally, the task of evidence production is
placed upon the parties, but there are certain practical reasons
which often preclude the production of a vital witness to permit
reasonable and intelligent examination of the facts by the judge
and jury.2
This article will attempt to shed some light on the circumstances in which the judicial perogative of calling witnesses
should be utilized, and when necessary precautions should be
exercised by a judge in using this perogative. Within this discussion attention will be directed to the role of the trial judge
in our legal system. As was stated by Judge Learned Hand:
A judge is more than a moderator; he is charged to see
that the law is properly administered, and it is a duty
which he cannot discharge by remaining inert.8
II. FRom WHEN E Tis Powmm CA=
The power of a trial judge to call a witness is inherently a
part of judicial administration. 4 The actual practice of this form
of judicial action had its origin in England5 and was later
adopted by some American courts.
1. 5 B. Joxns, COMmENTAzS ON EVIDENCE § 2287 (2d ed. 1926); H.
UDERHiLL, CRrIMNAL EVmENCE § 496 (5th ed. 1956); J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE

§ 2484 (3d ed. 1940).
2. See J. FRANH, CouRTS oN TRTAJL ch. VI (1963). Judge Frank's unblinking examination of the American adversary system points out the need
for more judicial action in the fact finding process.

3. United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945).

4. See 9 J. WIGuoRE, EVIDENCE § 2484 (3d ed. 1940).
5. E.g., Coulson v. Disborough [1894] 2 Q.B. 316. The English courts have
since limited the power of the trial judge to call a witness to criminal proceedings. See Rex v. Dora Harris [1927] 2 K.B. 587; In re Enouch [1910] 1

K.B. 327.
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In jurisdictions where the English rule, which required the
prosecution to call all of the eyewitnesses, was not adopted
American courts regarded the power of a judge to call a witness
as a form of protection for the accused in a criminal trial."
These decisions were later used as authority to give the state the
limited right to have witnesses called by the court when the
prosecutor did not want to be bound by their testimony.7 The
majority of American cases dealing with court called witnesses,
therefore, have been criminal actions; the probable reason being
the erroneous conception that the trial judge in a civil suit is a
moderator, with the parties solely responsible for the production
of evidence.
At present, the utilization of this power by trial courts, particularly in civil actions, is still in its infancy. Unquestionably
the power exists, yet only a minority of American jurisdictions
8
have used it or recognized its existence.
III. Is T

POWER A RIGT OR A DUTY?

A. The Judge's Right to CaZ1 a Witness
It has been generally conceded that a trial court is under no
affirmative duty to call witnesses at the request of either party
to the case. 9 The vast majority of the courts consider this judicial power a matter of discretion better left up to the individual
trial judge. 10 The majority view is that since, under the AngloAmerican trial system, the parties have the primary responsibility of producing evidence, a trial judge should call a witness
only when the adversary system fails to produce the necessary
facts and a miscarriage of justice would likely result.'1 Some
courts, moreover, have evidenced reservations about the desir6. E.g., Pugh v. State, 69 Tex. Crim. 357, 151 S.W. 546 (1912); Hill v.
Commonwealth, 88 Va. 633, 14 S.E. 330 (1892).
7. Brown v. State, 91 Fla. 682, 108 So. 842 (1926); People v. Cleminson,
250 Ill. 135, 95 N.E. 157 (1911); Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 676,

109 S.E. 201 (1921).
8. See 9 J. WmaoR, EVIDENCE § 2484 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
9. See 9 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2484 (3d ed. 1940) ; 44 IowA L. REv. 795
(1959).
10. See J. WIGmoRr, EVIDENCE § 2484 (3d ed. 1940). See also United

States v. Wilson, 361 F2d 134 (7th Cir. 1966); McBride v. Dexter, 250 Iowa
7, 92 N.W.2d 443 (1958) ; Commonwealth v. Bready, 189 Pa. Super. 427, 150
A2d 156 (1959).
11. Cf. J. WIcmoam, EvmNCE §§ 2483-84 (3d ed. 1940).
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ability of the use of this discretion 12 and have urged extreme
caution in its application.'3
Discriminatory use of the power to call a witness is reversible
error.14 In People v. Bell, 5 the defendant was tried for illegal
possession of narcotics and sentenced to life imprisonment. During the trial, the prosecutor requested that the court call as its
witness a special employee of the state who had purchased
narcotics from the defendant. The request was made so that the
state might avoid vouching for the credibility of the witness.
The court called the witness and both sides were allowed to
examine her. Later the defense asked that the witness be recalled
as the court's witness, but this request was refused. The appellate court reversed on the grounds that this refusal was an abuse
of discretion, stating: "Once the evidentiary door is opened in
the name of justice for the prosecution it cannot as a matter of
discretion be closed to the defendant."'
Another recent case held that it was an abuse of discretion
and a denial of due process for the trial court to call twentyseven witnesses on its own motion since only three of them had
been named in interrogatories requesting the names and ad7
dresses of all witnesses to the facts alleged in the complaint'
With reference to the trial judge's action this court said:
The power of a trial judge to call and examine witnesses is not unlimited. His conduct of a trial contrary
to traditional rules and concepts which have been established for the protection of private rights constitutes a
denial of due process. 18
B. The Judge's Duty to Call a Wine.ss
Only a few courts have suggested that a trial judge is under
a duty to call a witness on his own motion, and that failure to
do so could constitute reversible error.
12. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 331 F2d 265 (8th Cir. 1964); United

States v. Marzano, 149 F2d 923 (2d Cir. 1945).

13. See, e.g., City of Portales v. Bell, 72 N.M. 80, 380 P.2d 826 (1963);
Montesi v. State, 417 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. 1967). There have been few reversals grounded on abuse of discretion. In the cases where reversal did occur
the abuse was flagrant, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
14. E.g., People v. Bell, 61 Ill. App. 2d 224, 209 N.E.2d 366 (1965).

15. Id.
16. Id., 209 N.E.2d at 370.

17. Band's Refuse Removal, Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn, 62 NJ. Super.

522, 163 A.2d 465 (1960).

18. Id. at 548, 163 A.2d at 479.
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Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in
Johnsonv. United States19 carried a strong implication that in
certain circumstances the failure of a trial judge to call a witness
should result in reversal. In Johnson, even though there was an

eyewitness to the accident, both parties relied on the theory of
res ipsa loquitur. Neither party called the eyewitness and a
verdict was entered for the plaintiff. The dissent suggested that
the trial judge erred in allowing the plaintiff to rely on res ipsa
loguitzr when an eyewitness was available. In this instance,
Frankfurter suggested, the trial judge should have called the
witness since neither of the parties was willing to do so. 20 One
court has stated that when it is fairly clear that intervention
is necessary, it is obligatory that a chancellor in equity intervene
21
and call a witness.
Although generally leaving it within the sound discretion of
the trial judge as to when a witness should be called, several
courts by way of dicta have said that in circumstances in which
it appears a miscarriage of justice is likely, it is imperative that
the trial judge call a witness. These courts imply that judicial
inaction in these circumstances could constitute reversible
22

error.

It would seem that in light of the circumstances under which
court witnesses are or should be called, it is far more practical
to leave the exercise of the discretion flexible and completely in
the hands of the trial judge. His vantage point is far greater
than that of an appellate court in assessing the needs of the
trial. It would indeed be unfortunate to impose an affirmative
duty upon him to call a witness. Further, establishment of
guidelines for determining when this duty exists would be virtually impossible.
19. 333 U.S. 46, 50 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
20. Id. at 53-55. But see Note, Trial Judge's Duty to Call Witnesses it Res
Ipsa Loquitur Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 183 (1948). The writer there suggests that
the practice of calling witnesses by the court in res ipsa loquitur cases would
lead to insurmountable administrative problems that would outweigh the advantages gained by such action.
21. Moore v. Sykes' Estate, 167 Miss. 212, 149 So. 789 (1933). The Court
adamantly stated:
[W]hile . . . this duty of calling the witness and the conduct of
their examination is placed in the first instance and generally
throughout on counsel, the power and duty of the Chancellor in
that respect is not thereby abrogated ....
Id., 149 So. at 791.
(emphasis added).
22. See Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 424 Pa. 500, 230 A.2d 449 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Burns, 409 Pa. 619, 187 A.2d 552 (1963).
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IV. Tnn CRmna.AL AREA AND JmIcIAL Posrmvism
Perhaps the strongest argument for judicial action in calling
witnesses, as opposed to inaction, is to be made with regard to
criminal proceedings, in which life or death often hangs upon
a tenuous thread of fact. It is imperative, therefore, that all
available evidence which has bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the accused be brought to light. It has long been recognized
that the trial judge has the power to effectuate this illumination
23
when it otherwise could not be had.
As noted earlier, the expedient of having a witness called by
the court evolved as a modification of the English rule which
required that all the witnesses listed on the prosecution's indictment be called. Later it grew into a technique by which the
prosecution could have a witness put on the stand when the State
was afraid of being bound by his testimony.2 4
The rule against impeaching one's own witness 5 remains
today as the major reason why a party elicits the trial judge's
assistance in producing witnesses ;26 because when the court calls
the witness, the party who requested the witness be called can
impeach the witness on direct examination. 27
Some jurisdictions recognize the right of a trial judge to call
a witness in the interest of justice, but have sought to place
certain restrictions on this power to preserve the rule against
impeachment. Consequently, these courts have required either
that only eyewitnesses may be called,2 8 or that the parties requesting the court to act show that an injustice will result from
29

the failure to do so.

23. 2 H. UNDERHILL, CmrIxAL EViDE:N CE § 496 (5th ed. 1956); Annot.,
67 A.L.R.2d 538 (1959). Although the present discussion centers on the
court-called witness in criminal trials, the same considerations are supportive
of the right and the power of the trial court to utilize its own witnesses in
civil proceedings.

24. See Carle v. People, 200 Ill. 494, 66 N.E. 32 (1902).
25. An examination of the rule as it exists in the various jurisdictions can
be found in 3 J. WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE § 905 n.4 (3d ed. 1940).
26. See generally 44 IowA L. RZEv. 795 (1959).
27. E.g., United States v. Browne, 313 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1963); Browne v.
State, 91 Fla. 632, 108 So. 842 (1926) ; People v. Wesley, 18 Ill. 2d 138, 163
N.E.2d 500 (1959).
28. People v. Hundley, 4 Ill. 2d 244, 122 N.E.2d 568 (1954); People v.
Boulahanis, 394 Ill.
225, 68 N.E.2d 467 (1946) ; People v. Grisby, 357 Ill. 141,
191 N.E. 264 (1934). Another test developed by the Illinois court is the
"miscarriage of justice" test, which requires probable material injustice. See

People v. Banks, 7 Ill.
2d 119, 129 N.E.2d 759 (1955) ; People v. Bennett, 413
Il1. 601, 110 N.E.2d 175 (1953).
29. See Fournier v. United States, 58 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1932); People v.
Sears, 62 Cal. 2d 737, 40 P.2d 938 (1965).
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The court should explain to the jury that it is calling the
witness because neither side is willing to vouch for his honesty
and integrity. If the trial court fails to explain why it is calling
a witness on its own motion, the jury might be overly influenced
by subsequent testimony. 30 Since the trial judge must be very
careful to preserve an attitude of strict impartiality, some courts
have shown reluctance to take affirmative action which might
destroy this impartiality.3 ' The courts' reluctance to call their
own witnesses does not seem to be well founded since the problem of destroying impartiality in the jurors minds can be
remedied by proper instructions from the trial court.
It is settled that a judge may call a witness at his discretion
without any request by either of the parties to the litigation.32
It is also settled, however, that when a party makes a request,
he must show why the particular witness is essential to the case
and why he cannot call the witness. 33 Failure to make the necessary showing normally results in the court's refusal to call the
witness.3 4 In this situation it has been held reversible error for
the trial judge to act without a proper foundation having been
laid.3 5
30. See United States v. Wilson, 361 F2d 134 (7th Cir. 1966).
31. City of Portales v. Bell, 72 N.M. 80, 380 P.2d 825 (1963). See generally
Thomas, The Rule Against Impeaching One's Own Witness: A Reconsideration, 31 Mo. L. REv. 364, 387-89 (1966). This writer suggests that the
impeachment problem could be solved by having the court call all of the witnesses with the exception of the real parties.
32. United States v. Browne, 313 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Commonwealth
v. Bready, 189 Pa. Super. 427, 150 A.2d 156 (1959).
33. Such a showing of necessity was made in People v. Stoudt, 232 N.E.2d
800 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968), a homicide case, in which the state requested the
court to call the defendant's girlfriend to the stand. On the night of the
homicide, the defendant, bathed in blood, had gone to the witnesses' house to
wash his clothes. The court concluded that the defendant's relationship with
the witness was such that the prosecution could rightfully doubt the integrity
and veracity of the witness. Such a showing was also made in Smith v. United
States, 331 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1964), in which the prosecutor requested that
the court call an accomplice of the defendant who had previously pleaded guilty
to the same offense with which the defendant was charged and being tried.
34. United States v. Lester, 248 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Fielding v. United
States, 164 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1947) ; People v. Ricks, 86 Ill. App. 2d 70, 230
N.E.2d 50 (1967).
35. People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d 606, 213 N.E.2d 516 (1966). In this case
the prosecution called the defendant's wife to rebut testimony of the defendant
and after a few questions the court on its own motion made her its witness
and allowed her testimony to be impeached. In reversing, the supreme court
said:
[A] proper foundation must be laid for the calling of a court's
witness which would necessarily consist of the reasons why the
party desiring the witness cannot vouch for his veracity, and
showing that the testimony of the witness will relate to direct
issues . . ..

Id., 213 N.E.2d at 517.
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Both parties may cross-examine a court-called witness; this
has been unquestionably established.3 6 Nevertheless, some courts
have placed limitations upon the extent of the cross-examination
allowed.
The purpose of allowing cross-examination by both parties is
''
"to refresh [the] recollection, or to awake [the] conscience 37 of
38
the witness. Thus, in People v. BouZlhanis, the court said that
cross-examination does not include everything that may affect
credibility.
Although both parties should be allowed a thorough crossexamination of a court-called witness, its scope should be limited
to the issues of material importance. This would extend to the
court-called witness the usual protection against impeachment
on collateral matters. A proper application of this limitation is
found in People v. Cleminson.39 In this homicide case, the
Supreme Court of Illinois found that while the trial court had
properly called its own witness it had been too lenient in allowing the prosecution to degrade the witness, a friend of the defendant, by insinuating that the defendant had performed two
abortions for her.
V. UsE OF COUIT-CAL.ED WrTmEssEs IN Civm LITIGATION
A. Generally
If it is true, as Justice Frankfurter once stated, that "judges
are not referees at prizefights but functionaries of justice," 40
then there is no compelling reason why a trial judge should not
be able to summon a witness in a civil case. The English courts
have restricted this practice to criminal cases on the assumption
that in a civil case the judge merely "keeps the ring," but in a
criminal case the main judicial object is to see that justice is
done between the state and the accused. 41 The notion that a trial
36. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 361 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Young v. United States, 107
F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1939); Kissie v. State, 266 Ala. 71, 94 So. 202 (1957);
People v. Williams, 6 Ill. App. 2d 325, 127 N.E2d 505 (1955); Stoots v.

Commonwealth, 192 Va. 857, 66 S.E.2d 866 (1951) (dictum).
37. People v. Boulhanis, 394 Ill. 255, 68 N.E.2d 467, 469 (1946).
38. Id. This case contains an excellent discussion of other Illinois cases in
which cross-examination exceeded the allowable limits.
39. 250 Ill. 135, 95 N.E. 159 (1921).
40. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948) (dissenting opinion),
41. One English judge has reasoned that "a judge in a civil action must find
out the truth so far as the parties are willing to allow him to arrive at
it ... ." Rex v. Dora Harris, [1927] 2 K.B. 587, 590.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1969

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 5

NOTES

1969]

judge is a mere moderator in a civil action, however, is intellectually and practically unsound. While a party to a civil suit
need not fear physical incarceration resulting from a decision
against him, a substantial judgment enforceable by liens or
forced sales may place him in an extremely perilous financial
position. 42 The need for full disclosure of the available facts is
43
therefore equally as great in a civil suit as in a criminal trial.
Even so, the practice of a trial court calling a witness in a civil
case, as other than an expert, has not been widespread in
America. More recently, however, courts have begun to resort
to this procedure when the circumstances require additional evi44
dence that neither of the parties is willing or able to furnish.

As noted earlier, undue judicial restraint in a civil suit can
often be severely damaging. Because of this, a trial judge should
not, without a valid reason, refuse to call an essential witness
who is known by the court to be adverse to one of the parties.
Such inaction on the part of the trial judge can be considered
a miscarriage of justice and may result in reversal when re45
viewed by an appellate court.
B. Necessity of a Complete Trial Record
It is necessary to present a complete trial record in a civil
proceeding in order for an appellate court to have all the pertinent facts with which to review the case. Thus, when due to an
oversight on the part of counsel or other aforementioned circumstances the trial court's record is incomplete, it is necessary
and proper for a trial judge, on his own motion, to call witnesses
to elicit additional information for the purpose of clarifying
6
the record.4
C. Use in Equity
Although the method of allowing the court to call a witness
is used as a device to circumvent the rule against impeachment
of one's witness, 4 7 this is not always the case. There are times
42. See J. FRANxc,

CouRTS ON

TRIAL 96 (1963).

43. Id. at 102.

44. See, e.g., Green v. Smith, 59 Ill. App. 2d 279, 207 N.E.2d 169 (1965).

45. See Fortune v. Fortune, 138 A.2d 390 (D.C. Mun. App. 1958).
46. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chalmette Oil Distrib. Co., 143 F.2d 826

(5th Cir. 1944).

47. See, e.g., Green v. Smith, 59 Ill App. 2d 279, 207 N.E.2d 169 (1965);
Scroggs Feed & Grain Co. v. Vos, 254 Iowa 620, 118 N.W.2d 543 (1962).
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when only by calling a witness can the court obtain the facts
necessary for complete illumination of the issues. A proceeding
in equity is a notable example of an area where court-called
witnesses can be extremely useful. The sole determination of the
rights of the parties is a matter reserved to the sound judgment
of the presiding judicial officer. In order for him to reach a
decision upon the merits of the case, he must be fully apprised
of all facts having a bearing thereon. If additional testimony
is needed, the judge, master or chancellor as the case48 may be,
should in the exercise of his discretion call witnesses.
D. Positive Judiia

Action can Avoid Defects

That the potential defects in an adversary presentation can
be remedied by positive judicial action is well illustrated in the
Illinois case of Green v. Smith.49 Here, a suit was brought
against two defendants to recover damages for injuries sustained
in an automobile accident. On the day before the trial, the plaintiff executed a covenant not to sue with one of the co-defendants, who was subsequently dismissed from the suit. At the trial,
the defendant stated that she had intended to call the original
co-defendant as an adverse party before his dismissal. Because
she doubted his veracity, she did not want to call him as her
witness and asked the court to do so. The trial judge complied
with her request and gave both sides the opportunity to crossexamine. On appeal the appellate court affirmed the lower
courts action, stating:
The court may call a witness as its own when a party,
for good cause, will not vouch for the integrity and
veracity of the witness and his testimony appears necessary for the furtherance of justice. 0
48. In regard to the use of the power in equity the following cases are noteworthy:

(a) Bradley v. Canter, 200 Va. 747, 113 S.E.2d 878 (1960). Here the

Chancellor was faced with a question concerning the accounting of certain

trust proceeds. Since the original recipients of the proceeds were not present
in court, the Chancellor, upon his own motion, called one of the parties who
had knowledge of the original transaction to testify as to what took place.
(b) Commonwealth v. Cerlach, 399 Pa. 74, 159 A.2d 915 (1960). In a proceeding to compel specific performance of land purchased under an option, the
court, of its own motion, called the counsel for the plaintiff to testify as to
what had transpired in his office when the deed to the land in question was
signed.
49. 59 Ill. App. 2d 279, 207 N.E2d 169 (1965).
50. Id., 207 N.E.2d at 171.
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VI. ThiAL JUDGE'S POWER TO CALL A Wrinss nq
SoUrH CAROuNA

A. Use Of The Power
Once on the stand, the status of the court called witness in
South Carolina is unquestioned. 51 Substantial clarification is
needed, however, to determine when and to what extent the trial
judge can exercise this inherent power of calling his own
witness.
Only one South Carolina case, Elletson v. Dixie Home
Stores,52 has shed any light on the power of a trial judge to call
a witness in this jurisdiction. In Elletson, the plaintiff was
arrested by the police following a call from the manager of a
food store, who had allegedly seen the plaintiff place a jar of
coffee in his pocket and walk past the check out stand without
paying for it. Elletson was subsequently tried in the Municipal
Court of Greenwood and acquitted. He then instigated a malicious prosecution suit, and at the ensuing trial the question of
what had transpired in the municipal court became significant.
Since the municipal court is not a court of record, the trial
judge, on his own motion, called the Assistant City Attorney
who had prosecuted the case and the police officer who had
signed the arrest warrant, to place in the record the proceedings
of the municipal court. On appeal from a judgment for the
plaintiff, the defense contended that this action on part of the
trial judge was error. In affirming the trial court's decision, the
South Carolina Supreme Court said:
The court may of its own motion call a witness and
examine same even out of order. It is a matter within
the discretion of the trial judge, and we can see no
merit in appellant's contention that the circumstances
of the3 instant case are so unusual as to take it out of the
rule.

5

While this case enunciates the general rule as it is recognized in
other jurisdictions, a more positive statement is needed. There
is still much uncertainty as to what extent this power can be
utilized in South Carolina and what limitations, if any, the
South Carolina court will place upon it.
51. See Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 99 S.E2d 384 (1957).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 576, 99 S.E2d at 393.
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B. Results of Failure to Use the Power
State v. NelsonP4 is a striking example of a South Carolina
case in which the use of a court-called witness could have insured a complete trial record rather than reversal. The defendant was tried for the homicide of a nine year old child whose
body was found in a creek about a mile from the home of the
accused. At the time of the alleged murder the defendant's
mother was visiting one of the defendant's sisters in the same
community. At the coroner's inquest the mother of the defendant
testified that the defendant had confessed that she had smothered the child and her husband had taken the body from their
home and placed it in the creek.
Four days prior to the trial, counsel for the defendant served
the county solicitor with a written notice stating that the mother
would not testify at the trial as she had done at the inquest. The
notice also contained a sworn statement by the mother repudiating all of her testimony at the inquest and giving a full statement of what she would testify to at the trial. The solicitor,
nevertheless, called the mother as the state's witness and attempted to get her to admit the confession. The mother, instead,
gave alibi testimony. At the end of the testimony the solicitor
claimed surprise and asked for the right to cross-examine. The
trial judge granted this request over the objection of the defense
counsel and the solicitor used the prior testimony given at the
inquest to impeach the witness. On appeal, the supreme court
held that allowing the solicitor to impeach the witness with the
prior statement was reversible error because surprise, a necessary element in gaining the right to impeach one's own witness,
was lacking in this instance. It is submitted that had the trial
judge called this witness on his own motion or on the motion of
the solicitor, and allowed both sides the opportunity to crossexamine and impeach, neither side would have been prejudiced;
the truth surrounding the issue would have quickly come to
light and the record would have been complete, absent the
reversible error.
VII. CONCLUSION

Certainly, a trial judge is not a mere spectator viewing disinterestedly the adversary antagonists as they pit their skills in
the arena of the courtroom. The final decision of the contest, of
54. 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E2d 72 (1939).
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which he is an integral part, is accompanied by a profound
effect on one or all parties. Thus, when justice so demands, the
trial judge should enter the arena and use the power of his own
discretion to see that the jural audience has all of the facts
available in order to insure an honest outcome of the contest.
Of necessity, this power must be wielded with great care; but
when it appears evident that the adversaries are not able to use
all of the weapons at their disposal, then the court should use
its power to call a witness in the interest of truth and justice.
ErasoN D. SMITH, IV
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